the neurobiology of choice making

topic posted Wed, July 4, 2007 - 1:22 PM by 
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free will is of course the most debated topic in philosophical history, so they say, but neuroscience and psychological research on decision-making are putting libertarians in a tighter and tighter corner. even if we follow libet's logic that there are 100 ms for conscious awareness to exercise a "free won't" veto of unconscious impulses, what determines the conscious veto? alas, there appears to be no place to go outside of the causal stream to make a choice from, and even the magic pixie dust of quantum mechanics doesn't appear to provide free will -- just indeterminacy.

anyone want to discuss the free will issue, yet again? i just read libet's "mind time" and am finishing up wegner's "illusion of conscious will" and have been quite affected.
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  • Re: the neurobiology of choice making

    Fri, July 6, 2007 - 3:40 PM
    My take In a nutshell:

    At some level, and this may be at a higher level of dimensionality, the universe appears to be a closed system. We have a tendency, due to our nature as classifiers and predictors, to regard subsets of this closed system as independant (like saying a dog is seperate thing from the yard\universe it is running around in) but in fact these boundaries are arbitrary and only come from their usefulness for our brains in making predictions. In fact there is no distinction across matter, it all follows the same rules. Ruling out magic and anything that doesnt follow or isnt explained by the rules of physics, conciousness must be a property of the universe itself, forming pockets of structures complex enough for it to form representaions or models of itself. Your conciousness is just the universe looking at itself.

    Free will then? There are only two possibilities - there is free will and its source is shared by all matter, or there is not and the lack of free will is shared by all matter.

    thats my two cents.
  • Re: the neurobiology of choice making

    Fri, July 6, 2007 - 3:41 PM
    I'm not familiar with Libet's work, but Wegner's book was something special. I also highly recommend Timothy Wilson's "Strangers to Ourselves", which is a fairly recent review of the role of automated non-conscious processing - a sort of cognitive view of the unconscious. Anything by John Bargh is useful too.

    Re: free will/determinism, in my view that dichotomy is premised on a spurious concept of what it is to be an agent. It seems to me that the most compelling emerging story about how the brain performs large-scale complex actions like decision making is that it looks more like a vote in a boisterous parliment than a king sitting on the throne. I believe that the so-called executive function is heading the way of the luminous ether, and rightfully so.

    Not to get too philosophical, but if there is no unified executive within the brain, then the problem of free will is obviated. After all, who is choosing?
    • Re: the neurobiology of choice making

      Fri, July 6, 2007 - 4:29 PM
      thanks barnaby, wilson's book is on my queue on your prior recommendation. i recommend libet's "mind time" for a kind of master class summary of his (and his colleagues') many major contributions to cognitive neuroscience. his take on free will is rather disappointing: we don't know yet; we seem to have it; determinism cannot be proven; so let's just say we have free will for now. he hangs his hopes on the 100 ms of conscious awareness AFTER an unconscious impulse has begun.

      "Not to get too philosophical, but if there is no unified executive within the brain, then the problem of free will is obviated. After all, who is choosing? "

      exactly. that is the crux of the problem with the free will position, said very clearly. choices are being made, but they are determined, and not made by any executive choicemaker king.
      • Re: the neurobiology of choice making

        Fri, July 6, 2007 - 8:05 PM
        We cant really make good models of light or quantum particles without using statistics which says there is nondetirministic behvaior there. Maybe there are even smaller detirministic phenomenon that we dont understand which create these seemingly random behaviors, or perhaps there is some kind of quantum particle free will. Im not saying there is or isnt, but if there is free-will this is the place that I would put my money on it residing given the evidence we have to date.

        In any case, as we zoom out the probability of these very unpredictable quantum events occuring at large scales vanish into nothing. So at least at the level at which we work it seems like, for all intents and purposes, we are detirministic automatons (albiet complex ones.) There is no way that the brain, as a relatively macroscale and therefore highly predictable piece of matter, has any kind "free will" - those arguments are just hogwash as far as I can tell.

        This doesnt really make me upset :) If the illusion of free will is this good then what do I care if its real or not :P
        • Re: the neurobiology of choice making

          Fri, July 6, 2007 - 8:28 PM
          i'm certainly open to new information, but the logic of your statement is not sturdy: quantum indeterminacy doesn't give any room for free will, any more than choosing what to do based on a role of a die would.

          let's talk about the illusion of free will or conscious will and ask, why did it evolve? if, as libet's research indicates, the brain antedates its impressions to line up with stimuli, that means it had to have been selected for, since that is a very unlikely neutral trait or spandrel.
          • Re: the neurobiology of choice making

            Fri, July 6, 2007 - 9:37 PM
            re: the logic of your statement is not sturdy

            I didnt make any claim for or against, only for the possibility. As far as I know, quantum physics is a statistical model and does not provide any explanation - as any model does until a more refined model comes along. Where there is no explanation one should leave ones mind open shouldnt one?

            re: evolution of free will

            As for the evolution of the illusion of free will I think it is a natural thing. When a structure evolves that can model its surroundings it takes unwieldly high dimensional data and maps it into smaller dimensions to make reasoning about the data tractible. For instance when you try to figure out how many apples are in a basket you arent processing the light waves that hit your eyes directly but rather layer upon layer of brain cells sift through this information for patterns, label them, and transmit this new lower-dimensional data to the next layer (although I am not a neurobiologist and this is my lame interperetation of the process.) Eventually you "count four apples". Of course better brains can perform this process to a higher degree, leading to more and more abstract modes of thought, and more intelligent behavior. This is likely why it evolves in cases where flexibility (and thus intelligence) give an advantage.

            I believe that this process of labelling things for dimensionality reduction naturally leads to the concept of self - I even believe that "lower" intelligent animals have some analogue to the human idea of "self". I believe that is only once thought has evolved enough meta-knowledge that an intelligence might be able to reason out that these labellings are not actually reality but nothing more than a lense through which it is perceived.
            • Re: the neurobiology of choice making

              Mon, July 9, 2007 - 12:10 PM
              I find quantum mechanics to be an inadequate justification for free will, largely because the indeterminacy of quantum events factors out at the macroscopic level. Quantum particles interacting with large numbers of neighboring particles become more and more constrained in state space such that the aggregates become more deterministic as you zoom out. For quantum mechanics to truly introduce an element of non-determination, very high-level states of consciousness (like decision making) would have to be determined by individual quantum level events, and I think that is rather unlikely.

              Besides, is causal indeterminacy really what is meant by "free will"? I think not.
              • Re: the neurobiology of choice making

                Mon, July 9, 2007 - 3:26 PM
                >>"I find quantum mechanics to be an inadequate justification for free will, largely because the indeterminacy of quantum events factors out at the macroscopic level."

                This is exactly what I was trying to state. Pardon if I didnt communicate that properly.

                >.For quantum mechanics to truly introduce an element of non-determination, very high-level states of consciousness (like decision making) would have to be determined by individual quantum level events, and I think that is rather unlikely.

                I certainly was not trying to imply that quantum mechanical events caused your conciousness to have free will. There is zero evidence for that idea. I am not a Ramtha fan. :P

                I was trying to say that the quantum level is one of the only places in our model of the universe that we have no idea WHY something happens, the quantum model is purely statistical at some level and provides no explanation for the observed distribution of events. Since we have no explanation then it is *not impossible* that the particles "choose" where to be, or even that the act of observing causes some higher universal consciousness to make that choice instantaneously. On the other hand it could just be that "thats how it is", or maybe its a function of the speed of light coupled with some kind of string theory equation, or any number of other possible explanations. We simply dont have any idea why the observed events follow the observed distributions so any explanation is possible. That was all I was trying to say about quantum mechanics.

                One fact is certain - I AM self-aware. Somehow I have a first person experience of my own existence. Even if, as I believe is true, all of my mental processes are deterministic, I find this fact extremely profound. Why am I not simply a mindless automaton? What quality of this amalgam of matter causes this first-person experience to arise? Is it just the structure of the process my brain creates? Is there a sliding scale of less or more conscious structures\processes? Where is the breaking point if you are building or tearing down such a structure?

                My answer: I think that all matter exhibits the ability to generate "conciousness" and all it takes is a process through which a "model" of an external environment can be built and sustained. You might place a measure on the class of such systems by measuring their ability to acurately model every detail of their environment. This would always be fractional of course since no model of a real environment is ever 100% acurate. The scale would range from 0 to 1, never reaching 1.

                However some important points would lie on this scale. Some models would be static and unable to adapt to changes in the environment. At a higher level some models might incorporate time, and another might be able to dynamic modify itself with new data. A still higher level might incorporate a model of the modeller itself ("self") with respect to the environment. The basic idea being that, where there is meaning and structure in the data representing the environment, a better model represents more and more of this meaning and structure.

                Legg and Hutter talk about a formal definition of intelligence with respect to machines, but their mechanism relies on some idea of "success" with respect to some goal the modeller is trying to achieve (www.vetta.org/documents/B...ce-Talk.pdf) I believe that intelligence\consciousness has only to do with model sophistication and that no "goal" is required in order measure it.
                • Re: the neurobiology of choice making

                  Mon, July 9, 2007 - 5:41 PM
                  personally, i am less and less impressed by consciousness and awareness. sounds weird, eh? what the hell do i mean? i mean that it is simply not the mysterious dumbfounding leap that people make it out to be. matter responding to other matter, e.g. the evolution of the eye from photosensitive cell to the present day... all gradients of matter wrapped around variably successful replicative structures. we're matter curled in on itself, responding to itself, blinking bits of accumulated design patterns over time. amazing? YES. amazing in some qualitatively different way than the rest of nature? NOPE. i think we are simply narcissists much of the time in our philosophies (especially when comparing ourselves to other living creatures). but then again, isn't narcissism amazing?
                  • This is the maximum depth. Additional responses will not be threaded.

                    Re: the neurobiology of choice making

                    Mon, July 9, 2007 - 6:59 PM
                    LOL. :)

                    Yep i agree that behavior itself, even "intelligent" behavior, is not that mind blowing. But I am still fascinated by fact that I have a first-person experience of the world around me. Why should that be so given that its just atoms smashing into one another...
                    • Re: the neurobiology of choice making

                      Mon, July 9, 2007 - 7:03 PM
                      "But I am still fascinated by fact that I have a first-person experience of the world around me. Why should that be so given that its just atoms smashing into one another..."

                      fascinating, but not magical in a mysterious sense. the more we learn about the brain and all its signals, the more subjective experience makes sense. you couldn't have a successful animal without basic proprioception. once we started to be able to move, things got weirder!
                      • Re: the neurobiology of choice making

                        Mon, July 9, 2007 - 8:48 PM
                        You dont find physical detirminism slightly lacking in explanation of the fact that you experience your life from a single point of view, despite the fact that you are pre-detirmined to do what you do by physics and that your body isnt even made of all the same atoms throughout your life? Why should there be consciousness at all? Why not just very complex processes occurring on their own with no "one" watching or experiencing them? I think its more than fascinating, I believe it is a seperate question from that of intelligence\behavior, and one that is unadressed by science at this point.
                        • Re: the neurobiology of choice making

                          Tue, July 10, 2007 - 5:26 PM
                          "You dont find physical detirminism slightly lacking in explanation of the fact that you experience your life from a single point of view, despite the fact that you are pre-detirmined to do what you do by physics and that your body isnt even made of all the same atoms throughout your life? Why should there be consciousness at all?"

                          no. i dispute your claim that there is a "single point of view" that is somehow transcendent of the body, so i have no contradiction.


                          "Why should there be consciousness at all? Why not just very complex processes occurring on their own with no "one" watching or experiencing them?"

                          there is no "one" watching or experiencing them. consciousness is the experience of a variety of stimuli and signals vying for importance. the most important signals become conscious. it's a way of divvying up signals so a creature isn't bogged down or fragmented -- both quite maladaptive for moving creatures in dynamic environments. i dispute the notion that there is a single you experiencing the world from an armchair inside your brain.


                          "I think its more than fascinating, I believe it is a seperate question from that of intelligence\behavior, and one that is unadressed by science at this point. "

                          unaddressed isn't fair. it just hasn't been sufficiently answered, just like a billion scientific matters. the question is, why did consciousness evolve? have you looked for the answers or are you stunned by the phenomenon into mysticism?
                          • Re: the neurobiology of choice making

                            Tue, July 10, 2007 - 7:37 PM
                            re: "there is no "one" watching or experiencing them. consciousness is the experience of a variety of stimuli ..."

                            This makes no sense to me.

                            en.wiktionary.org/wiki/experience

                            "experience (plural experiences)

                            Event(s) of which one is cognizant.
                            Activity one has performed.
                            Collection of events and/or activities from which an individual or group may gather knowledge, opinions, and skills."

                            So since there is no "one" in your world, who does the experiencing? You do have a first person experience of your life do you not?
                          • Re: the neurobiology of choice making

                            Tue, July 10, 2007 - 7:42 PM
                            You know, some things in the world are still mysteries...

                            but, just curious, what part of what I am saying sounds like "mysticism" to you? I think it would be nice if what I was saying was rationally considered instead being taken as some kind of hippie goo (you too Fifi!). I am quite a rational and scientific person and would like the opportunity to explain anything you dont understand about the way I see things. You are also welcome to disagree...
                            • Re: the neurobiology of choice making

                              Tue, July 10, 2007 - 10:56 PM
                              Ok since I seem to be unable to explain my point of view to the other posters here, I have found someone else who can... Its not the only point of view on the subject of (Dennet disagrees for example) but its one that resonates well with my own... I am simply not satisfied with a purely functional explanation of the brain as the sole explanation for my personal experience of its workings. They could be happening without my having to be here, in a purely mechanical fashion. This is problem in consciousness theory known as the "gap".

                              Mr Chambers explains it well and various approaches to it including the denial tactic. Its a little long but quite a good read.

                              consc.net/papers/facing.html

                              Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness
                              David J. Chalmers

                              "...If these phenomena were all there was to consciousness, then consciousness would not be much of a problem. Although we do not yet have anything close to a complete explanation of these phenomena, we have a clear idea of how we might go about explaining them. This is why I call these problems the easy problems. Of course, "easy" is a relative term. Getting the details right will probably take a century or two of difficult empirical work. Still, there is every reason to believe that the methods of cognitive science and neuroscience will succeed.

                              The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. ..."
                • Re: the neurobiology of choice making

                  Tue, July 10, 2007 - 6:28 AM
                  Jason - "Since we have no explanation then it is *not impossible* that the particles "choose" where to be, or even that the act of observing causes some higher universal consciousness to make that choice instantaneously."

                  Not impossible but highly unlikely - and while you may dismiss "Ramtha", you're certainly not dismissing Ramtha/whateverhernameis' pseudoscientific ideas that are based upon the idea that 'the observer" influences observations on a Quantum level. The two basic problems with this theory is that "the observer" as it was spoken about regarding quantum mechanics wasn't about a witnessing consciousness that interceded (human or divine) but about how the machines used to measure/observe influenced what could be observed. The second is that the quantum level is not the same as the macro level in physics. It's also possible that planet earth is really an experiment run by white mice, just not very probable despite how many white mice we observe in labs.

                  Okay, so you *think* all matter generates consciousness. What actually proof or indication of this do you have?
                  • This is the maximum depth. Additional responses will not be threaded.

                    Re: the neurobiology of choice making

                    Tue, July 10, 2007 - 9:44 AM
                    re: quantum stuff

                    Already stated my position here. But as they say in the music biz, "One more time..."

                    From en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quan...tanglement

                    "Now suppose Alice is an observer for system A, and Bob is an observer for system B. If Alice makes a measurement in the eigenbasis of A, there are two possible outcomes, occurring with equal probability:

                    Alice measures 0, and the state of the system collapses to [Equation]
                    Alice measures 1, and the state of the system collapses to . [Equation]
                    If the former occurs, any subsequent measurement performed by Bob, in the same basis, will always return 1. If the latter occurs, Bob's measurement will return 0 with certainty. Thus, system B has been altered by Alice performing a local measurement on system A. This remains true even if the systems A and B are spatially separated. This is the foundation of the EPR paradox."

                    Clearly stated in terms of an observer. Anyway I am NOT stating that it IS the case that any of that causes consciousness. I am stating that if you dont have a statisctical model for some phenonemon and no explanatory mode then you cannot rule out explanations. Period. It is just unscientific to do so because it requires you to manufacture a negative proof from nothing. Again, terribly sorry if my post was unclear.


                    As for my idea about matter and consciousness I think you misunderstand it. It is not that all matter generates consciousness but maybe I can explain it in a way that you are less hostile too: "consciousness", by my own definition (and since there is no useful standard definition I feel compelled to define it for myself), is a property of a system which is related to that systems ability to mode its "environment". All properties of such systems, including temporal modelling, memory, self modelling, anything that can be considered a part of the model, may enhance consciousness and give rise to new important behavior and modes of consciousness. I take a lot from Dennets agent-based philosphy and from machine intelligence and information theory to come to this definition. Although this is not a wide-spread view, you must undertand and buy this concept in order to move forward.

                    If you can buy that then think of the set of all material systems as being on a sliding scale, where no environment model lies at 0 and the perfect environmental model lies at 1. Obviously simpler systems like a rock sitting on a hill lie toward the bottom while a fantasy super intelligence taking up most of the matter in the universe, might lie somewhere near 1. The idea implies that matter can be organized into a large number of systems which have various levels of complexity and accuracy in their model of the environment around them.

                    So no I do not think that "all matter generates consciousness".

                    I believe that all matter is capable of being arranged in such a way that a model of its environment may arise and I think of "consciousness" as a variable property of such systems.
                    • Re: the neurobiology of choice making

                      Tue, July 10, 2007 - 5:30 PM
                      "All properties of such systems, including temporal modelling, memory, self modelling, anything that can be considered a part of the model, may enhance consciousness and give rise to new important behavior and modes of consciousness. I take a lot from Dennets agent-based philosphy and from machine intelligence and information theory to come to this definition"

                      how can you write this and still be dumbfounded by how consciousness may have evolved? it's certainly not an epiphenomenon or spandrel. we can begin the work of figuring this out, no?
  • Re: the neurobiology of choice making

    Tue, March 24, 2009 - 9:08 PM
    At the age of 76 with no scholastic exposure to this area, just a fascination with"self", which is where and who seeks an understanding of consciousness lies, I will speak as a true layman. My handle on other sites is intuition, which is where I sometimes come from.

    But one of the few books that I have read in my dottering old age, one which I am sure all of you are familiar with is Susan Blackmore's Conversations on Consciousness. She interview twenty-one individuals; neuroscientists, psychologists, philosophers, cognitive scientists, biologists, MD's, psychophysiologists and mathematicians. They appear in alphabetical order to insure no bias. Much discussion, with the emphasis on the "hard problem" and free will.

    Defining it, why is it, where is it, how does it work etc. etc. No consensus. I was even introduced to zombies. I sat in a theatre, scratching my neurons worrying over quantum physics. Now understanding that all of these individuals were quite confident of their stand or lack there of, I must admit that I finished the book (one reading) as confused as they all were.

    Back to my opening self. Self (no definition supplied) is what we use to determine what self is. Mind/Brain, neuronal only, or other wise, is the "tool" (the only one) we have for the study of consciousness. It is still a ;mysterious piece of gray meat that seems to be asking itself to explain itself.

    Territorial imperative seems necessary. Should it be.

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